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Inter- and Intra-generational Consequences of 
Pension Buffer Policy under Demographic, 





We study numerically the inter- and intra-generational welfare consequences of alternative 
pension fund policies in response to unexpected demographic, financial and macro-economic 
shocks. Our analysis is based on an applied many-generation OLG model describing a small-
open economy with heterogeneous agents featuring a two-pillar pension system (with PAYG 
and funded tiers). We explore two policies to avoid underfunding of the pension funds. One is 
to always first raise the pension contribution rate ("contribution policy"), the other is to 
always first reduce indexation to productivity and price inflation ("indexation policy"). These 
policies have different consequences for different generations. Of the existing generations, on 
average the youngest prefer the indexation policy, while the older generations prefer the con-
tribution policy. When expressed in terms of a constant difference in rest-of-life consumption 
the consequences of switching from one to the other policy are generally non-negligible. They 
also differ rather widely for the various cohort/income groups. Our stochastic simulations 
show that pension buffers are highly volatile when the shocks are drawn from realistically 
modelled multivariate shock processes. Underfunding occurs relatively frequently. Most of 
the volatility arises from uncertainty about the yield curve (the rate at which pension liabilities 
are discounted). 
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All around the world interest in funded social security is increasing. However, the properties and
welfare consequences of funded social security systems are still insu¢ ciently explored. In particular,
such systems are relatively heavily a⁄ected by exogenous shocks (Sita and Shoven, 2003; Diamond,
2004), which raises discussions about risk sharing among generations (see Gollier, 2008). In this
respect, the social security system in the Netherlands represents an ideal framework to study.
Dutch social security is characterised by a three-pillar pension system: a pay-as-you-go (PAYG)
de￿ned-bene￿t ￿rst pillar for which every inhabitant is eligible, a funded de￿ned-bene￿t second
pillar that is mandatory for most employees, and a voluntary funded third pillar. The ￿rst pillar
allows for intra-generational redistribution, because contributions are wage dependent, while ben-
e￿ts are ￿ at. The second pillar is formed by pension funds that receive contributions from workers
and ￿rms, invest those contributions and pay bene￿ts to the retired. Through their contributions
workers accumulate within a personal account claims to nominal bene￿ts once they are retired.
The Dutch system somewhat resembles some of the social security reforms proposed for the US,
most noticeably the progressive personal accounts proposal by Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2008).
However, in contrast to the Dutch system, in their proposal the rate of accumulation of pension
rights may depend on the existing stock of rights, while the account is held in the form of a security
that is marketable and that, moreover, pays an indexed bene￿t from retirement onwards. In the
Netherlands, accumulated claims of workers and retired alike are usually indexed to wage or price
in￿ ation. However, there is no legal obligation for pension funds to index those claims. Pension
funds rather similar to those in the Netherlands are also under development in Germany. However,
the second pillar in the Dutch system is unusually large and provides on average a higher retire-
ment bene￿t than the ￿rst pillar. The Dutch system features one further important peculiarity
compared to other industrialized countries, as the majority of the funds in the second pillar are
sectoral rather than corporate funds. This implies that employees rather than employers are the
risk bearers in the system.
An important indicator of the safety of future second-pillar pensions is the so-called funding
ratio, de￿ned as the value of the pension fund￿ s assets divided by its liabilities. A funding ratio
above one indicates that the fund has su¢ cient resources to cover all future pension bene￿ts that
follow from existing accumulated pension rights. Exogenous shocks may lower the funding ratio
below a critical level that forces the fund￿ s management to take remedial action. For example,
negative shocks to the funds￿assets can be spread over all generations through reduced indexation
of bene￿ts. Overall the second pension pillar thus allows for inter-generational risk sharing. The
set of instruments in hand of the fund￿ s management includes not only a change in the degree
of indexation, but also a change in the pension contribution rate, and a reduction in nominal
pension rights. This third instrument is typically the last resort for pension funds, while a change
in indexation either alone or combined with a change in the contribution rate is generally used
to eliminate underfunding. Underfunding has become a particularly important problem recently
in the Netherlands because of the collapse of stock markets and the fall in the long-run interest
rate (implying less heavy discounting of future obligations). Therefore, many pension funds have
chosen not to index bene￿ts at the time of this writing (2009). The pension supervisor (the Dutch
central bank) determines the speed at which pension bu⁄ers have to be restored. During the
previous economic downturn (2002 - 2003) when also pension funding ratios became dangerously
low, it forced a quick restoration of the bu⁄ers, resulting in higher pension contributions, reduced
disposable income and allegedly a prolongation of the downturn. Its current attitude seems to be
more relaxed, although it requires funds to present credible plans to eliminate underfunding within
2the next ￿ve years.
Although alternative policies can have identical implications for the pension funding ratios, their
consequences for the welfare of the di⁄erent generations can di⁄er substantially. While a reduction
in indexation spreads the burden of adjustment over all working and retired generations, with the
older generations contributing relatively more because of their larger nominal wealth, an increase
in contribution rates only directly a⁄ects workers. Workers who are further from retirement can
expect to contribute more to the restoration of a given degree of underfunding than workers who
are close to retirement.
This paper explores the inter- and intra-generational welfare e⁄ects of di⁄erent policies to
stabilise pension bu⁄ers in an applied many-generation small open-economy OLG model with het-
erogeneous agents. Speci￿cally, we compare a policy in which (when necessary) the contribution
rate is always adjusted ￿rst (a "contribution policy") with a policy in which indexation to produc-
tivity and price in￿ ation are always adjusted ￿rst (an "indexation policy"). In those cases where
one instrument is insu¢ cient, the other instrument is also adjusted. In the extreme situation that
both instruments together are insu¢ cient, also nominal claims are scaled back by whatever amount
is necessary to eliminate the underfunding within the allowed restoration period.
In our stylised economy, the pension system consists of a ￿rst pillar PAYG component and a
funded second tier. We calibrate the pension system to the Dutch situation. This may seem too
speci￿c. However, many countries have reformed or are reforming their pension system, providing
a larger role to funded pensions. Owing to the large role of its second pillar, the Dutch system is
often used as an example (whether it is followed or not) for reform elsewhere. We calibrate the
remaining exogenous parameters according to the standard literature, while we estimate our shock
processes on US data over the past decades. In our stochastic simulations, we hit the economy
with a variety of unexpected shocks. These may be broadly classi￿ed into three categories: demo-
graphic uncertainty (the size of newborn generations and survival probabilities that determine life
expectancy), economic uncertainty (in￿ ation rate and productivity growth) and ￿nancial uncer-
tainty (returns on bonds, equity and residential real estate, as well as the yield curve). There are
no individual shocks, only aggregate shocks.
Our stochastic simulations show that pension bu⁄ers are highly volatile when the shocks are
drawn from realistically modelled multivariate shock processes. In fact, underfunding occurs much
more frequently than anticipated by the Dutch pension supervisor and policy intervention is fre-
quently needed to prevent long-run underfunding. Changes in the contribution rate are often
supplemented with changes in the indexation rate, and vice versa. By far most of the volatility
arises from uncertainty about the yield curve (the rate at which pension liabilities are discounted).
Our two policies have di⁄erent consequences for di⁄erent generations. Of the existing genera-
tions, on average the youngest prefer the indexation policy, while the older generations prefer the
contribution policy. The yet unborn on average also prefer the indexation policy. These outcomes
are probably not too surprising, because the young have on average accumulated relatively few
nominal claims, so are a⁄ected only mildly by changes in the degree of indexation, while as workers
they would bear the full burden of a change in pension contributions. By contrast, the retired
would be una⁄ected by a change in pension contributions, but (given their relatively high level
of accumulated pension claims) would share substantially in the adjustment burden if it is to be
achieved through a change in indexation. One of the merits of this paper, we believe, is that it
also quanti￿es the consequences of alternative policies for di⁄erent cohorts and individuals with
di⁄erent levels of skills and thus di⁄erent income-earning capacity. When expressed in terms of a
constant di⁄erence in rest-of-life consumption the consequences of switching from one to the other
policy are generally moderate, though non-negligible (up to a maximum of almost 1%). They also
3di⁄er rather widely for the various cohort/skill groups and are largest for the highest skill group.
Our contribution builds on three strands of the literature: the literature on applied OLG
models (e.g., Auerbach and Kotliko⁄, 1987, and Hubbard and Judd, 1987), the literature that
studies the welfare properties of unfunded and funded social security systems (e.g., Huggett and
Ventura, 1999, and Teulings and de Vries, 2006) and the literature that analyses how a wide
variety of unexpected shocks a⁄ects the economy (see Imrohoroglu et al., 1995; De Nardi et al.,
1999, and SÆnchez-Marcos and SÆnchez-MÆrtin, 2006). To the best of our knowledge, this is the
￿rst contribution simultaneously dealing with all the aforementioned three aspects. In particular,
Bonenkamp and van de Ven (2006) consider a two-generation OLG model, but ignore shocks to
in￿ ation and single asset returns. Hari et al. (2007) focus only on the role of mortality risk
for the solvency of pension funds. However, simultaneously incorporating demographic, economic
and ￿nancial shocks is important for the stochastic simulations to produce realistic pension fund
behavior.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework.
Section 3 describes the benchmark calibration, and Section 4 shows the main ￿ndings from a
simulation exercise based on this calibration. Section 5 describes a sensitivity analysis around the
model￿ s baseline parameter values and the institutional setting. Section 6 concludes the main text.
Finally, the Appendix, Section 7, provides further details on the chosen calibration as well as the
estimation of the underlying models used in the stochastic simulation.
2 The Model
There are a number of D cohorts alive in any given period t . Each cohort j (= 1;:::;D) consists of
Nj;t individuals at time t, who are distributed in I equally-sized skill groups, i = 1;:::;I. A higher
value of i denotes a higher skill level. The skill level of a person determines her income, given her
age and the macroeconomic circumstances. Index j = 1;:::;D indicates the age of the cohort,
computed as the amount of time since entry into the labor force. Further, all individuals within a
given group earn the same income. Finally, a period in our model corresponds to one year.
2.1 Cohorts and demography
We assume that each individual born in period t ￿ j + 1 (that is, the person has age zero at the
start of t ￿ j + 1 and age one at the end of this period) has an exogenous marginal probability
 j;t￿j+1 2 [0;1] of reaching age j (at the end of period t) conditional on having reached age j ￿1.
For example,  j;t￿j+1 = 1 means that an individual alive at age j ￿ 1 at the end of period t ￿ 1
will be alive with certainty at the end of period t and have age j then. Similarly,  j;t￿j+1 = 0
implies that anyone alive at age j ￿ 1 at the end of period t ￿ 1 will surely die before the end of
period t. Speci￿cally, we assume that  j;t￿j+1 = 0 for any j ￿ D + 1. To be precise, we assume
that individuals can die only at the start of a period, so that the survival of that moment implies
that the person reaches the end of the period and receives an income and consumes during that
period. We further assume that the cohort of newborn agents in period t is 1 + nt times larger
than the cohort of newborn agents in period t ￿ 1, that is,
N1;t = (1 + nt)N1;t￿1: (1)
In general, we denote with Nj;t the size of cohort j in period t. This size depends on the history
of past survival probabilities. Indeed, for j = 2;:::;D:
4Nj;t = Nj￿1;t￿1 j;t￿j+1:
2.2 Individuals
Individuals in the same cohort can only di⁄er in terms of their income. Each individual in a given
cohort belongs to some skill group i, with i = 1;:::;I. We assume that individuals remain in the
same skill group over their entire life. Individuals work until the exogenous retirement age R and
live for at most D years. During their working life (j = 1;:::;R), they receive a labour income yi;j;t
given by:
yi;j;t = eisjzt; (2)
where ei; i = 1;:::;I is an e¢ ciency index (linked to the skill level of class i), sj; j = 1;:::;R a
seniority index (income varies with age) and zt is an exogenous income process:
zt = (1 + gt)zt￿1; (3)
where gt is the exogenous nominal growth rate of the process and z0 = 1.













If all workers have identical productivity (i.e. e1 = ::: = eI = s1 = ::: = sI = 1), then yt = zt.
We make a distinction between yt and zt because the relative sizes of the cohorts may change over
time, implying that the ratio yt=zt will ￿ uctuate over time.
2.3 Social security and accidental bequests
Social security is based on a two-pillar system. The ￿rst pillar is a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) de￿ned
bene￿t (DB) program which pays a ￿ at bene￿t to every retiree. It is organized by the government,
which sets the contribution rate to ensure that the ￿rst pillar is balanced on a period-by-period
basis. The second pillar is funded and may either be organized by the government or by the private
sector. In reality, in the Netherlands some of the parameters of the second pillar are set by the
government, while other parameters are set by the pension fund itself. Since we do not explicitly
model the objectives of the di⁄erent policymakers we do not need to make speci￿c assumptions
about who sets which parameters. Finally, the government redistributes the accidental bequests
left by those who die.
2.3.1 The ￿rst pillar of the social security system
Each period, an individual of working age pays a mandatory contribution pF
i;j;t to the ￿rst pillar










































t are policy parameters. In period t a retiree receives a ￿ at bene￿t that is a
fraction ￿F of the average income in the economy:
bF
t = ￿Fyt: (6)
Given the bene￿t formula in equation (6), each period the contribution rate ￿
F
t adjusts such that
aggregate contributions into the ￿rst pillar PF
t equal aggregate ￿rst-pillar bene￿ts BF































Note that under this system an individual earning a low income pays no contributions but still
receives the same bene￿t as an individual with a high income.
2.3.2 The second pillar of the social security system
The second pillar consists of a DB funded program. Each period, an individual of working age also
pays a mandatory contribution pS
i;j;t to this second pillar if her income exceeds the franchise income




t maxf0;yi;j;t ￿ ￿ytg; j ￿ R; (8)
where ￿
S
t is a policy parameter. The parameter ￿
S
t is capped at a maximum value of ￿
S;max > 0.
A cohort entering retirement at age R + 1 receives a bene￿t linked to her entire wage history.
Period t bene￿ts for an individual in skill group i of cohort j are given by:
bS
i;j;t = Mi;j;t; j ￿ R + 1; (9)




























where parameter ￿ denotes the annual accrual rate of nominal rights as a share of income above the
franchise level. The productivity indexation parameter ￿t and the price indexation parameter ￿t
capture the degree of indexation of nominal rights to (approximately) real income growth,
1+gt
1+￿t ￿1,
and in￿ ation, ￿t, respectively. Indexation policy aims at following total wage growth: however the
actual degree of indexation may depend on the ￿nancial position of the pension fund. Further, mt
captures a proportional reduction in nominal rights that may be applied when the pension bu⁄er
is so low that restoration through an increase in contributions and a reduction in indexation is no




S;max and ￿t = ￿t = 0. Each individual enters the labour market with zero nominal
6claims. Hence, Mi;0;t￿j = 0, where Mi;0;t￿j are the nominal claims at the end of period t ￿ j or
the beginning of period t ￿ j + 1 when the generation enters the labour market at age 0. Notice
that, in contrast to the ￿rst-pillar pension bene￿t, the second-pillar bene￿t depends on both the
cohort and skill level of the individual.
For a given accrual rate and franchise parameters ￿ and ￿, for each period t the policymaker






. The choice of this combination depends on the






At the end of period t the pension fund￿ s assets are the sum of the second-pillar contributions from
workers in period t minus the second-pillar bene￿ts paid to the retirees in period t plus the pension
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is the gross nominal rate of return on the pension fund￿ s asset portfolio with a constant share ze
invested in equities, a constant share zh invested in the housing market and the remainder in one-




t ) are exogenous.
The fund￿ s liabilities are the sum of the present values of current and future rights already









Future bene￿ts are discounted using a term structure of annual nominal interest rates frk;tg
D
k=1,
which we simulate and then normalise (see Section 2.5) to ensure that the interest rate at maturity
k = 1 equals the one-year bond interest rate, r1;t = rb
t. Hence, the expected present value at time
t of current and future bene￿ts of a cohort j in skill group i is
Li;j;t =
8
> > > > <






























; if j ￿ R + 1;
9
> > > > =
> > > > ;
(15)
Note that  j;t￿j+1 cancels out in the above equation. When j ￿ R, furthermore, we discount all
future bene￿ts to the current year t, but of course they will only be paid out once individuals have
retired.
2.3.3 Accidental bequests
Accidental bequests do not have any signi￿cant bearing on our results. Their only role is to ensure
that resources do not "disappear" because people die. All personal (non-pension) ￿nancial wealth



















where ai;j;t are the assets accumulated by each individual in cohort j in skill group i at the end
of period t ￿ 1 and which become available for collection by the government at the start of period








2.4 Individual decision problem
In a given period t an individual of cohort j in skill group i chooses a sequence of nominal con-
sumption levels for the rest of her life. Savings are then invested in a portfolio of bond, equity and














































where u(:) is the period utility function, which we assume to be of the conventional CRRA format





subject to equations (1)-(15), and the intertemporal budget constraint
ai;j+l+1;t+l+1 =
8
> > > <
> > > :




if j + l ￿ R




if j + l ￿ R + 1
9
> > > =
> > > ;
;
where ai;j+l;t+l are the assets (wealth plus income) in year t+l of an individual in skill group i of
cohort j + l and





















is the overall return on her asset portfolio in period t+l+1, the composition of which is age-speci￿c






at the end of period t + l. Note that the
portfolio choice varies with age, but for given age it is assumed to be ￿xed across skill categories.
The end of next period￿ s assets equal the gross return on this period￿ s assets minus consumption,
plus "net income". For the workers, net income is labour income minus social security contributions
plus the accidental bequest, while for the retired net income equals the sum of the social security
bene￿ts plus the accidental bequest.
8The Euler equation for this problem is










In our simulations below we approximate the expectation on the right-hand side of this equation
using a Gauss-Legendre quadrature method. The calculation of the expectation makes use of the
stochastic multivariate distribution of the shocks.
2.5 Shocks
We assume that there are only aggregate, hence no individual-speci￿c shocks. In our model, eight
types of aggregate exogenous shocks hit the economy. Speci￿cally, we consider demographic shocks
(to the growth rate of the newborns cohort and to the survival probabilities), in￿ ation rate shocks,
nominal income shocks (which, together with the in￿ ation shock, produce a shock to the produc-
tivity growth rate) and ￿nancial market shocks (to bond returns, equity returns, housing returns















t : shock to the newborn cohort growth rate nt
￿ ￿
 







t: shock to the nominal income growth rate gt
￿ ￿￿
t : shock to the in￿ ation rate ￿t
￿ ￿b
t: shock to the one-year nominal bond return rb
t
￿ ￿e
t: shock to the nominal equity return re
t
￿ ￿h
t : shock to the housing return rh
t
￿ ￿k;t;k = 2;:::;D: shock to the return yield at maturity k > 1, rk;t.
All these shocks a⁄ect the size of the funding ratio (equation (11)), whereas only the demo-
graphic shocks a⁄ect the ￿rst pillar of the pension system (equation (7)). As a consequence, the
key parameters of the pension system have to be adjusted to restore the balance in the ￿rst pillar
and to maintain sustainability of the second pillar.
The demographic shocks are independent of each other and of all other shocks (at all leads
and lags). The growth rate nt of the newborns cohort depends on deterministic and random
components:
nt = n + ￿n
t ;
where n is the mean and ￿n



































; j = 1;:::;D:
with ￿j an age-dependent coe¢ cient, ￿ a constant growth factor (to describe the historical trend
increase in survival probabilities) and ￿
 
t￿j+1 an innovation at time t ￿ j + 1 that follows an i.i.d.
process with variance ￿2
 .
We allow the shocks to the in￿ ation rate, the nominal income growth, the one-year bond return,
the equity return and the housing return to be correlated with each other and over time. These



































































































































































































We ￿nally turn to the term structure of annual nominal interest rates (yield curve). We set
the interest rate at maturity k = 1 equal to the one-year bond interest rate arising from the above
multivariate process, r1;t = rb
t. To describe the remaining interest rates of the yield curve, we
focus on the rates in excess of the bond interest rate at maturity 1, e rk;t = rk;t ￿ rb
t;k = 2;:::;D.
Following the prevailing literature (see, e.g., Evans and Marshall, 1998; Dai and Singleton, 2000),





















































































Each period t, the excess interest rate at maturity k, e rk;t;k > 2, is a linear combination of
deterministic and random components. The deterministic part is a function of several variables at
time t￿1: the excess interest rates at all maturities k > 2, and the ￿ve macro and ￿nancial variables
whose shocks follow the VAR(1) process (17). The random part is given by the innovations ￿k;t,
which may be correlated across maturities.
10The average yield curve frkg
D
k=1 is given by the average yield at maturity 1, rb, computed
above, and the following expression for the interest rates at higher maturities (where we have used



















































































We assume that the government automatically adjusts the contribution rate ￿
F
t 2 [0;1] to maintain
a balanced ￿rst pension pillar, equation (7). On average, this contribution rate increases over the
years along with population ageing.
More policy options are available to a⁄ect the funding ratio of the second pillar. Indeed, there







, the two indexation parameters
f￿t ￿ 0;￿t ￿ 0g and, as a last resort, a reduction mt in the nominal pension rights. Policymakers










u). There is a third boundary, 1+￿
l (￿
l < ￿
m), which is considered
to be the level below which there is "underfunding". Policy adjustments take place as follows
(the formal rules are in Appendix 7.1). When the funding ratio falls below 1 + ￿
m a long-term
restoration plan is started, while when it falls below 1+￿
l a short-term restoration plan is started.
When the ratio exceeds 1 + ￿
u, measures are taken to reduce the funding ratio. Policy is always
aimed at moving the funding ratio back into the interval [1 + ￿
m;1 + ￿
u].
We consider two broad policies for adjustment. In the case of a short-term or a long-term
restoration plan, under a contribution policy the contribution rate is always raised ￿rst, while
under an indexation policy productivity indexation and then price indexation are always reduced
￿rst. If this adjustment under either type of policy is insu¢ cient, the other instrument is also
adjusted. That is, under the contribution policy further adjustment takes place through reduced
productivity and then price indexation, while under the indexation policy further adjustment is
made through an increase in the contribution rate. In the rather extreme case that adjustments
in the indexation parameters and the contribution rate are jointly insu¢ cient, nominal rights are
scaled back by whatever amount is necessary to eliminate the underfunding within the allowed
restoration period. In the case of a long-term restoration plan, nominal rights are left untouched.
When the funding ratio exceeds 1+￿
u, missed nominal rights are always given back ￿rst, followed
by a restoration of missed price and productivity indexation in the case of the indexation policy
and a reduction of the contribution rate under the contribution policy. If all these adjustments
are still insu¢ cient, the contribution rate is reduced under the indexation policy, while price and
productivity indexation are restored under the contribution policy.






for year t+1 is determined in year
t on the basis of a projection e Ft+1 of the funding ratio at time t+1, computed from the size of the




Li;j;t of the various cohorts in year t (averaged over the




We consider three measures of welfare, one is cohort-speci￿c and the other two are economy-
wide. The ￿rst is the intertemporal utility function Vi;j;t for skill group i 2 f1;:::;Ig and cohort
j 2 f1;:::;Dg in year t. The second measure, SA
t , is de￿ned as the unweighted average of the














The third measure, ST
t , is de￿ned as the unweighted average of the intertemporal utilities of all



























with q the discount rate applied to future generations￿welfare. In the simulations, we truncate
the computation of welfare to 250 unborn generations, as the discounted welfare of subsequent
generations is negligible in equation (18).1 Note that in equation (18) the size of any unborn
generation is normalised to the size of the population alive in year t.
To ease the interpretation of the three measures Vi;j;t, SA
t and ST
t , we report them in terms
of constant consumption ￿ ows. As regards the cohort-speci￿c measure Vi;j;t, we de￿ne "certainty
equivalent consumption" CECi;j;t for skill group i 2 f1;:::;Ig, cohort j 2 f1;:::;Dg in year t, as
the certain, constant consumption level over the remainder of the cohort￿ s lifetime that yields a

















































































































where integer[:] is the function that generates the largest integer smaller than or equal to the
number inside the square brackets. Note that this is the constant consumption stream of a person
of age J that gives her a utility equal to social welfare St. It is not the constant consumption
stream that gives a person of age J the utility level that he has under the relevant policy.

































i;t, we calculate (analogous to (20) and (21)) skill-group speci￿c constant con-
sumption ￿ ows CA
i;t and CT
i;t.
2.7.1 Comparison of policy scenarios
We evaluate welfare under a scenario A relative to the welfare under a scenario B. The two sce-
narios are identical in everything apart from the policies adopted in the second pension pillar.
In the following, scenario A implements the indexation policy, while scenario B implements the
contribution policy. In both scenarios the parameters are initially identical and equal to those in
the benchmark calibration. They keep unchanged in the following years as long as the funding
ratio remains between 1+￿
m and 1+￿
u. Once the funding ratio falls below 1+￿
m or rises above
1 + ￿
u, the parameters change according to the speci￿c policy in place. They then vary on the
basis of the ￿ uctuations of the funding ratio.
We consider four measures of welfare comparison between the two policies. A ￿rst natural
measure is the constant percentage di⁄erence in certainty equivalent consumption between the two
scenarios. For each skill group and cohort in a given period this measure is computed as:
￿CECi;j;t (A;B) ￿
CECi;j;t (B) ￿ CECi;j;t (A)
CECi;j;t (A)
; (22)
where CECi;j;t (s) denotes the value of CECi;j;t under scenario s 2 fA;Bg. We consider three
further measures to compare welfare between the two policies in a single number. One is the
"majority support" for policy B, that is the share of those alive at t = 1 that are better o⁄ under












1fCECi;j;t (B) > CECi;j;t (A)g; (23)
13where 1f:g is an indicator function that assigns a value of one (zero) if the condition inside the
curly brackets holds (does not hold). The ￿nal two measures of welfare comparison are the "social
welfare gain" from using policy B rather than policy A, excluding, respectively including, the

















3 Calibration and details of the simulation
We follow the standard literature and calibrate the exogenous parameters of the model to reproduce
the main features of the US economy. However, the pension arrangements are calibrated to the
Dutch situation. Table 1 summarises our benchmark calibration.
We assume that the economically active life of an agent starts at age 25. Individuals work for
R = 40 years until they reach age 65. They live for at most D = 75 years, that is until age 100.
Their coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is set to ￿ = 2, in accordance with a large part of the
macroeconomic literature. The discount factor is set to ￿ = 0:98, slightly above the usual choice
of 0:96 because individuals also take into account their survival probabilities. To compute the
welfare measure (18) we try several discount rates of the utility of unborn generations. We ￿nd no







j=1 is taken from mean values from the 2007 wave of the Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF, 2009).2 Portfolio composition is reported by age groups, and we
interpolate the data using the spline method. We keep the portfolio weights constant for ages as
of 90. The e¢ ciency index feig
I
i=1 is given by the income deciles in the US for year 2000 taken by
the World Income Inequality Database (WIID, 2008). We normalise the index to have an average
of 1. The seniority index fsjg
I
j=1 uses the average of Hansen￿ s (1993) estimation of median wage
rates by age group. We take the average between males and females and interpolate the data using
the spline method.
The exogenous social security parameters are speci￿cally calibrated to the Dutch situation. For
the ￿rst social security pillar we set the bene￿t scale factor ￿F = 17% to generate a realistic average
replacement rate of 30:40%. The Dutch Tax O¢ ce ("Belastingdienst") reports for 2008 a maximum
income assessable for ￿rst-pillar contributions of EUR 3;850:40 per month. We therefore set our
upper income threshold for contributions ￿
u = 1:10, roughly equal to 3;850:40 ￿ 12=42;403, where
EUR 42;403 is our imputation of the economy￿ s average income as of 2008.3 The lower income
threshold is set to ￿
l = 0:56, in such a way as to generate a starting contribution rate ￿
F
1 = 16:42%,
consistently with the reality. For the second social security pillar, historically the accrual rate has
been between 1:5 and 2%, and most frequently at 1:75%. We therefore consider ￿ = 1:75% and
2We aggregate assets into three categories: bonds (transaction accounts, certi￿cates of deposit, savings bonds,
and bonds), equities (stocks, investment funds, cash value of life insurance, other assets) and housing (residental
properties).
3In Eurostat the most recent statistic on average income in the Netherlands refers to year 2005. The same
source also provides the minimum income until year 2008. Exploiting the correlation between average and minimum
income, we run an OLS regression of average income over time and minimum income. As a result, we predict the
average income of year 2008 to be EUR 42;403.
14set the franchise to ￿ = 0:33, to generate a realistic average replacement rate of 37:60%. In our
simulations we consider a short-term restoration period of Ks = 5 years when the pension bu⁄er
falls below 1+￿
l and a long-term restoration period of Kl = 15 years when the pension bu⁄er falls
below 1 + ￿
m, but remains at or above 1 + ￿




















f45%;5%g. Our choice for
￿
ze;zh￿
corresponds to the balance sheet average for the Dutch pension
funds over the period 1996 - 2005 (source: Dutch central bank, DNB, 2009). Because the various
assets in the pension fund￿ s portfolio generally have di⁄erent realized returns, at the end of each








Finally, we set the starting levels of the indexation parameters to ￿1 = ￿1 = 100% (hence the
pension fund provides full indexation to nominal wages). The starting second-pillar contribution
rate is set in such a way that aggregate contributions at time 1 coincide with aggregate bene￿ts in
the absence of shocks. The rate that satis￿es this condition is ￿
S
1 = 17:58%, which is close to the
average actual contribution rate in the Netherlands. We then choose initial assets A0 that generate
an initial funding ratio F1 of 130% in the absence of shocks.4 The contribution rate is capped at
￿
S;max = 25%.
The deterministic growth rate of the newborn cohort, ￿ = 0:47362%, is the average growth
from a regression using 20 observations on the annual variation in the number of births in the US
between 1986 and 2005 (the source is the Human Mortality Database, HMD, 2009); details on
the regression are in Appendix 7.2. This Appendix also describes our calibration of the survival
probabilities based on the Lee-Carter model (Lee and Carter, 1992). The combination of survival
probabilities and birth rates determines the size of each cohort. The starting value of the old-age
dependency ratio (i.e., the ratio of retirees over workers) is 25:23%, in line with OECD statistics
for 2005.
4Initial assets A0 are 1:9088 times the total income in the economy. This is on the high side compared to the actual
Dutch situation. However, in our model every worker participates in the pension fund, while in the Netherlands
this is only part (though a majority) of those who are employed. Moreover, a large fraction of the workers has his
pension arranged through insurance companies, while the self-employed do not participate in pension funds either
(they have the possibility to build up their pension through an insurance company, but the ￿nancial reserves of
insurance companies are not considered part of the pension bu⁄ers).
15Table 1. Calibration of the exogenous parameters
Symbol Meaning Calibration
General setting
D Number of cohorts (= maximum death age -25) 75
R Number of working cohorts (= retirement age -25) 40
￿ Relative risk aversion parameter 2
￿ Discount factor 0:98






j=1 Household portfolio composition SCF (2009)
feig
I
i=1 E¢ ciency index WIID (2008)
fsjg
I
j=1 Seniority index Hansen (1993)
First pillar pension parameters





Income thresholds in the contribution formula f0:56;1:10g
Second pillar pension parameters
￿ Accrual rate 1:75%
￿ Franchise share 0:33
￿
ze;zh￿










f￿1;￿1g Starting indexation f100%;100%g
￿
S
1 Starting contribution rate 17:58%
￿
S;max Upper bound on contribution rate 25%
Crucial is the calibration of the average annual values of price in￿ ation, nominal income growth
and the bond, equity and residential real estate returns. Table 2 lists our benchmark calibration
based on the US economy. We choose the values loosely following the literature (see, e.g., Brennan
and Xia, 2002, and Van Ewijk et al., 2006) and set the average in￿ ation rate at ￿ = 2%, the average
nominal income growth rate at g = 3% (which corresponds to an average annual real productivity
growth rate of 1%), the average one-year bond interest rate at rb = 3%, and the average residential
real estate return at rh = 4%. The average equity return is set at re = 5:625% to generate a funding
ratio that is stable over time in the absence of shocks and policy parameter changes.5 Innovations
in these ￿ve variables follow the VAR(1) process described in Appendix 7.2.3. Appendix 7.2.4
provides details on the estimation of the parameters of the process for the yield curve frk;tg
D
k=1.
Table 2. Calibration of the annual averages of the random variables
Symbol Description Calibration
￿ In￿ ation rate 2%
g Nominal income growth rate 3%
rb One-year nominal bond return 3%
re Equity return 5:625%
rh Residential real estate nominal return 4%
Note: the Appendix reports the estimates of the stochastic components
5The selected average equity return is well below its historical value, but is a fairly common choice in the literature
(see, e.g., Cocco et al., 2005, and Gomes and Michaelides, 2005).
16To obtain the optimal consumption rules from equation (16) we solve the individual decision
problem recursively by backward induction using the method of "endogenous gridpoints" (Carroll,
2006). Shocks to the in￿ ation rate, the income growth rate and the bond, equity and real estate
returns introduce through equation (17) ￿ve state variables into the model. To avoid the curse of
dimensionality caused by having too many state variables, we determine the optimal rule in year







t￿1 = 0. We approximate the random variable distributions by means of a Gauss-Legendre
quadrature method (see Tauchen and Hussey, 1991), and discretise the state space using a grid of
100 points with triple exponential growth.6 For points that lie outside the state space grid, we use
linear extrapolation to derive the optimal rule.
We simulate N = 1;000 times a sequence of vectors of unexpected shocks over 2D￿1+250 = 399
years, drawn from the joint distribution of all the shocks. Our welfare calculation is based on the
economy as of the Dth year in the simulation. Hence, we track only the welfare of the cohorts that
are alive in that year, implying that those that die earlier are ignored, and we track the welfare
of cohorts born later, the latest one dying in the ￿nal period of the simulation. Hence, the total
number of years of one simulation run equals the time distance between the birth of the oldest
cohort that we track and the death of the latest unborn cohort that we track. At each moment
there are D overlapping generations. For the sake of simplicity, we relabel the Dth year in the
simulation as t = 1. The purpose of simulating the ￿rst D ￿ 1 years is to simply generate a
distribution of the assets held by each cohort at the end of t = 0.
In each simulation run, we assume that the ageing process stops after t = 40. That is, mortality
rates at any given age no longer fall. This assumption is in line with the fact that some important
ageing studies, such as those by the Economic Policy Committee and European Commission (2006)
and the United Nations (2009), only project ageing (and its associated costs) up to 2050, hence
roughly 40 years from now. Moreover, it is hard to imagine that mortality rates continue falling for
many more decades at the same rate as they did in the past. In particular, many of the common
mortal diseases have already been eradicated, while it will become more and more di¢ cult to treat
remaining lethal diseases. E⁄ective treatment of those diseases will also surely be held back by the
fact that the share of national income that can be spent on health care is bounded.
To allow for the cleanest possible comparison between the contribution and indexation policies,
we use the same shock series under both policies, while, moreover, during the initialisation phase of
each simulation run no policy responses occur (that is, there is constant and complete indexation
and the contribution rate is kept constant). Hence, the starting situation at the end of t = 0
or beginning of t = 1 (before choices are made) is identical in each run under the two policies.
Because welfare depends on the size of the bu⁄er after the initialisation period in the simulation
run, we reset the stock of pension fund assets such that the bu⁄er at the end of t = 0 equals 130%.
Finally, the process zt is re-normalised to unity at the end of t = 0 and the nominal pension claims
of the various cohorts are rescaled accordingly. At the start of the preceding D ￿ 1 dummy years,
liabilities are set at the steady state values implied by the income level at that moment. They are
computed using (10) under the assumption of no shocks (i.e. expectations are treated as if they
are realised).
6We create an equally-spaced grid of the function log(1 + log(1 + log(1 + s))), where s is the state variable.
The grid with "triple exponential growth" applies the transformation exp(exp(exp(x) ￿ 1) ￿ 1) ￿ 1 to each point
x of the equally-spaced grid. This transformation brings the grid back to the original scale of the state variable,
but determines a higher concentration on the low end of possible values. A grid with triple exponential growth is




The simulation analysis under the two types of policies is conducted in two steps. In Section 4.2
we explore the behaviour of the pension funding ratio, the instruments and welfare when shocks
are absent, while Section 4.3 reports the main ￿ndings for the full stochastic simulation based on
the benchmark calibration.
4.2 Simulation without shocks
In the absence of shocks, equity returns and population ageing drive the trend of the funding ratio.
Panel a of Figure 1 shows the trend with ￿ = 0 (no growth factor in survival probabilities) under
three scenarios: when (i) the policy parameters are ￿xed to their benchmark values, (ii) the fund
applies an indexation policy, and (iii) the fund applies a contribution policy. Keeping the policy
parameters ￿xed (thus ignoring the funding ratio threshold 1+￿
u), the funding ratio tends to rise
gradually over time (solid line), driven by the relatively high rate of return on the fund assets as
compared to the nominal income growth rate. If we instead set the parameter ￿ to its benchmark
level, and therefore allow for a gradual growth in survival probabilities, the funding ratio under
unchanged policy parameters tends to fall over the relevant years (see Panel b of Figure 1). The
fall is however modest and, taking into account all years in the simulation run, the ratio is never
below 1:13 (as opposed to an initial level of 1:30). Hence, the e⁄ects of population ageing and
relatively high portfolio returns o⁄set each other.
a. Without population ageing b. With population ageing
Figure 1. Funding ratio in the absence of shocks
Under either an indexation or contribution policy the funding ratio becomes stable in the
region comprised between 1 + ￿
m and 1 + ￿
u. In panel a of Figure 1 the funding ratio evolves
identically under both policies.7 In panel b of Figure 1 (with growth in the survival probabilities),
the funding ratio is temporarily higher under the contribution policy. Figure 2 below shows the
policy parameters in an economy with population ageing and explains why this is the case. When a
7From the start onwards there is full indexation to productivity and price changes. As soon as 1+￿u is reached, the
contribution rate is reduced (both under the indexation and the contribution policy). This momentarily prevents the
funding ratio from rising above 1 + ￿u. However, at this new parameter combination, the ageing process dominates
and the funding ratio starts to decline (until the 1 + ￿m is crossed and a long-term restoration plan is started).
18policy change is made necessary (that is, when the funding ratio falls below 1+￿
m), contributions
rise under the contribution policy, while productivity and sometimes price indexation fall under
the indexation policy. In this case without shocks, deviations from the target 1 + ￿
m are small
and under neither policy there is a need to simultaneously change the contribution and indexation
parameters. However, it is worth to point out that, while the contribution policy prescribes only one
large adjustment in the contribution rate, the indexation policy produces more frequent adjustments
in the indexation parameters. As a result, only the funding ratio under contribution policy keeps
on increasing until the threshold 1 + ￿
u is reached.
a. Contribution rates b. Indexation parameters
Figure 2. Alternative policies in the absence of shocks
The solid line in Figure 3 shows the cohort and skill group-speci￿c di⁄erence in CEC between the
two policies (as de￿ned in equation (22)). Positive values indicate a preference for the contribution
policy. More speci￿cally, a value of ￿CECi;j;1 equal to X% indicates that cohort j of skill group
i enjoys X% more units of certainty equivalent consumption over the rest of its life under the
contribution policy than under the indexation policy. The ￿gure for "all skill groups" is computed
as the average of the CECs across all the individual skill groups. Welfare di⁄erences in this scenario
without shocks are limited to no more than 0:09% of rest-of-life consumption. Cohorts of age above
60 have no preference for either policy because the ￿rst instrument adjustment, whether it is an
increase in the contribution rate or a reduction in indexation, only takes place after forty years,
i.e. when these older cohorts have already died.
19Figure 3. Contribution vs. indexation policy - no shocks
￿CEC > 0: better-o⁄ with the contribution policy
The intuition for generations younger than roughly 60 at t = 1 preferring the contribution policy
is as follows. First, if a fall in the funding ratio is stemmed by a reduction in indexation, all existing
generations contribute to restoration of the funding ratio, while an increase in the contribution rate
only a⁄ects workers. Ceteris paribus, on average workers would be in favour of reducing indexation.
However, part of the adjustment burden is shifted onto generations that are born in the future and
whose welfare is not counted. With an indexation policy the burden of adjustment on the current
wokers continues until they die (as missed indexation will never be restored in their lifetime), while
with a contribution policy the adjustment burden vanishes when the worker retires and it is the
younger and future workers that continue to contribute to the restoration. For the workers alive
at t = 1 (and younger than roughly 60), it is the larger involvement of the future workers that
gives the contribution policy a small edge over the indexation policy. We indeed obtain that a
share D1 = 66:94% of the alive population support a contribution policy, which generates a small
welfare gain of ￿CA
1 = 0:04% compared to the indexation policy. However, taking into account
future generations, a contribution policy instead slightly reduces welfare (￿CT
1 = ￿0:07%).
The relative preference for a contribution policy is smaller the older is a generation of workers
at t = 1. The intuition is that older workers (though younger than roughly 60) will experience only
a very brief period of reduced indexation or a higher contribution rate. This di⁄erence between
the two policies over a short period is expressed in terms of a constant consumption di⁄erence over
a large number of remaining years of life as of t = 1.
For the di⁄erent skill groups (with higher skill levels denoted by a higher group number),
qualitatively the cohort-pro￿le of the policy comparison is identical. However, the size of the
welfare di⁄erence depends on the income level. The (relative) desirability of a contribution policy
is lower for the lowest skill groups.8
8In Figure 3 we neglect the ￿rst two skill classes as individuals in these groups are too poor to receive a reasonable
bene￿t from the second-pillar system.
204.3 Stochastic simulation
Now we turn to the stochastic simulation of our model for the benchmark parameter setting. In
each period an entire new shock vector as described in Section 2.6 is drawn and shocks are allowed
to propagate over the lifespan of each cohort. Figure 6 displays the median (over the N runs) size
of the funding ratio.9 When the policy parameters are kept constant throughout, the bu⁄er moves
along a downward trend. When a policy reaction takes place, the policy parameters are adjusted
to gradually restore the funding ratio. Our two policies, the indexation policy and the contribution
policy indeed manage to keep the median funding ratio above the threshold 1 + ￿
m. However, the
development of the median funding ratio (see Figure 4) hides a wide dispersion of individual paths
for the funding ratio. Over all the observations simulated for the relevant years (1,000 times 75
years), the bu⁄er falls below 1 + ￿
l in no more than 21% of the cases under both policies, against
the 45% observed under no policy intervention.
Figure 4. Median funding ratio
Adjustments in the second-pillar parameters not only restore the bu⁄er, but also reduce the
volatility of the funding ratio. In Figure 5 we report the median coe¢ cient of variation (quartile
deviation over median) resulting from our simulations in the three cases. This measure is computed
for each period over the cross-section of simulation runs. The upward-sloping trend of the coe¢ cient
when the policy parameters are kept constant suggests that the funding ratio ￿ uctuates more when
the bu⁄er is farther from its target. However, the volatility of the funding ratio stabilises at around
19% under our two policies.
9We report the median size rather than the average size, because the former measure is not a⁄ected by the few
extreme outcomes generated in our simulations.
21Figure 5. Funding ratio volatility
The median policy responses to unexpected shocks are shown in Figure 6. Panel a. of the
￿gure shows the contribution rates. The ￿rst-pillar contribution rate is identical in both policies
and shows a clear upward-sloping trend, from 16% in year 1 to 22% in year 40 consistent with the
ageing of the society (which in our model depends on the trend increase in the survival probabilities,
and is stopped after year 40).
The second-pillar contribution rate (the dashed lines) instead reveals a di⁄erent development
under the two policies. Under the contribution policy, it starts increasing immediately after the
funding ratio falls below 1+￿
m. Instead under the indexation policy, the median contribution rate
increases later. Both policies end up generating a median contribution rate of 25% after 15 years.
The average contribution rate under indexation (contribution) policy is 19:11 (17:27) percent. Panel
b. of Figure 6 shows the median indexation parameters. Under the indexation policy, we observe
in early years a reduction in both productivity and price indexation. The reduction in indexation
￿especially price indexation ￿arises later under the contribution policy. On average, price and
productivity indexation are larger under indexation policy rather than contribution policy (95:12
and 81:18 against 91:22 and 70:30 percent). Notice that an indexation policy produces on average
larger indexation parameters and contribution rates than a contribution policy. The former is the
result of the restoration of lost indexation when the funding ratio exceeds 1 + ￿
u.
However, the medians shown in Figure 6 hide a lot of dispersion of the instruments. The within-
year standard deviation of the parameters is very large (around 10% for the contribution rates, and
around 200% for the indexation parameters, with a peak of 259:31% for productivity indexation
under indexation policy). An adjustment in only indexation or the contribution rate is made in
29% and 14% of the simulations respectively under the indexation and the contribution policies.
A change in both instruments is needed in around 4% (10%) of the cases under an indexation
(contribution) policy.
22a. Contribution rates b. Indexation parameters
Figure 6. Alternative policies: median values
We are also interested in comparing welfare under the two policies. When the second-pillar
parameters are kept constant over time (i.e., under "no policy"), we obtain social welfare equivalent
consumption of the alive generations of CA
1 = 88:76% (as computed according to equation (20)).
This is higher than social welfare under both an indexation policy (CA
1 = 88:01%) and a contribution
policy (CA
1 = 87:52%). One reason is that the aging-induced fall in the funding ratio (as shown
in Figure 1b) that would occur under "no policy" is o⁄set through an increase in contributions
and/or less indexation. Second, policy interventions introduce additional uncertainty in disposable
resources, and therefore consumption. The ￿rst line of Table 3 summarises the welfare e⁄ect of
the alternative policies across all individuals. Social welfare is higher under an indexation policy
(CA
1 = 88:01%) than under a contribution policy (CA
1 = 87:52%). Expressed in terms of the
certainty equivalent consumption di⁄erence, this di⁄erence is ￿CA
1 = ￿0:56%. One may also
wonder whether this ￿nding is con￿rmed once the welfare of future-born generations is taken into
account. The answer is yes, as we ￿nd that ￿CT
1 = ￿0:48% (￿0:44%) using a discount rate of
welfare of future generations of q = 4% (10%) ￿see equation (18).
It may also be interesting for policymakers to know what is the share of the alive (voting)
population that prefers one policy or the other. The ￿nal column of Table 3 reports the average
percentage of individuals in the economy that are better o⁄ under the contribution policy than
under the indexation policy (the measure D1 computed according to equation (23)). Of all agents
in the economy only 39:69% prefer the contribution policy.
23Table 3. Welfare consequence of a policy reaction (many shocks over many years)
CA






Whole population 88.0140 87.5200 -0.5613 -0.4823 39.6923
Skill group #1 24.9408 24.9361 -0.0185 -0.7356 50.7261
Skill group #2 37.9377 37.9025 -0.0927 -0.4256 47.0370
Skill group #3 48.7591 48.5584 -0.4117 -0.6150 42.5324
Skill group #4 58.5041 58.3074 -0.3363 -0.4852 40.9440
Skill group #5 67.3886 67.1612 -0.3374 -0.3704 40.2455
Skill group #6 76.5047 76.2383 -0.3482 -0.2960 39.9493
Skill group #7 87.4824 86.9932 -0.5592 -0.2237 39.6874
Skill group #8 103.7908 103.1734 -0.5948 -0.2085 39.4856
Skill group #9 132.9080 132.0207 -0.6677 -0.1448 39.2704
Skill group #10 236.9171 234.3306 -1.0917 0.1515 39.1090
Note: group #1 has lowest skill level, while group #10 has highest skill level
Figure 7 reports the average percentage di⁄erence in the CEC (computed according to equation
(22)) under the two policies for various cohorts alive at t = 1 and di⁄erent skill groups. Most,
though not all, cohorts prefer the indexation policy. The indexation policy generates an average
welfare gain of around 0:9% CEC for the middle-aged cohorts and a welfare loss of around 0:5% for
the oldest cohorts. The indexation policy is generally preferred by the working generations as it
allows them to share their risks with the retired, while this is not the case under the contribution
policy. The retired prefer the contribution policy as this shelters them from the consequences
of pension underfunding. Those in the highest income brackets experience the largest welfare
e⁄ects. This may seem surprising, as these individuals have accumulated more nominal claims,
and an indexation policy reduces the indexation parameters more frequently than a contribution
policy. This result is driven by the restoration indexation, which allows for indexation above 100%.
Indeed, over the entire sample of simulations, the average indexation parameters are higher under
indexation policy than under the contribution policy (95:12% instead of 91:22% for price indexation,
and 81:18% instead of 70:30% for productivity indexation).
The welfare di⁄erence between the contribution policy and the indexation policy is larger than in
the case without shocks (and overturns the ranking there). The reason is that without the shocks,
the ￿rst adjustment in the instruments was only after forty years, while with shocks, instrument
adjustment is often needed in the very short run already (compare Figure 6 with Figure 2). These
instrument adjustments which usually go into the direction of reducing consumption resources
weigh relatively heavily in the utility computation if they happen early into the simulation run.
Hence, the di⁄erence in welfare between the two types of policy generally gets more pronounced.
The welfare comparison between the two policies also di⁄ers across the skill groups (see Table 3
and Figure 7). Excluding the two lowest skill groups, which are on average below or marginally
above the franchise and thus indi⁄erent between the two policies,10 each skill group has on average
a preference for the indexation policy. However, among the highest skill groups we ￿nd a relatively
larger support for an indexation policy if we look at the generations alive at t = 1 and for a
contribution policy if we also consider the generations born after t = 1. Only in the highest skill
group the welfare comparison ￿CT
10;1 = 0:15% shows a welfare-improving role for a contribution
policy (it is instead ￿CT
10;1 = ￿0:07% if we discount the welfare of future generations at a rate
q = 10%).
10However, we ￿nd a preference for either policy in the few cases where shocks bring these skill classes above the
franchise.
24Figure 7. Contribution vs. indexation policy - benchmark
￿CEC > 0: better-o⁄ with the contribution policy
5 Sensitivity analysis
Our simulations are based on a variety of assumptions about the economy, in particular on the
returns on assets, as well as the institutional features of the social security system. This section
explores the robustness of our main results for some of those assumptions. For each scenario we
report the number of times the funding ratio falls below the threshold 1 + ￿
l = 105%, welfare CA
1
under an indexation policy, and the three welfare comparison measures (23)-(25).
5.1 Growth rates
First, we explore how our results are a⁄ected by the di⁄erence between the return on the fund￿ s
asset portfolio and the nominal income growth rate. Under our benchmark parameter combination,
the average fund portfolio return was rf =
￿
1 ￿ ze ￿ zh￿
r1 + zere + zhrh = 4:23%. We consider
nominal equity returns of re = 4% and 7%, implying average fund returns of rf = 3:50% and 4:85%
respectively, which translates into a di⁄erence with the average income growth g of rf ￿g = 0:50%
and 1:85% respectively. In the benchmark scenario, this di⁄erence was 1:23%.
The most important (not surprising) consequence of varying the equity return is that the
fraction of time the funding ratio is below 105% falls with the average nominal equity return. Fur-
thermore, welfare increases when average equity returns are higher. However, welfare comparisons
are virtually unchanged ￿on average individuals are still better o⁄under the indexation policy (see
Table 4).
5.2 Dutch shock correlations
We now use for our stochastic simulation a VAR regression based on Dutch data ￿see Appendix
7.2.5 for the details. Comparing Tables 6 and 7 in the appendices, we notice a lower volatility of
25in￿ ation, wage and one-year bond shocks for the Netherlands than for the US. In contrast, equity
and housing returns are much more volatile. The ￿ve variables are also less strongly correlated.
As a result, with these new data the funding ratio falls below 105% during a larger fraction of the
time than under the benchmark case (see Table 4).
The two policies generate more similar policy parameters (under the indexation policy on av-
erage ￿
S
t = 18:77%, ￿t = 81:52% and ￿t = 95:47%, while under the contribution policy on average
￿
S
t = 17:77%, ￿t = 72:89% and ￿t = 92:75%). However, in the simulations all the parameters are
also more volatile apart from the contribution rate under contribution policy, whose coe¢ cient of
variation actually reduces (it is 60:83% instead of 63:46% in the benchmark analysis). Furthermore,
the likelihood of restoring missed indexation (linked to either price or productivity) is higher for
the contribution policy (missed indexation is restored in 8:14% of the cases, as opposed to 7:82%
in the benchmark analysis), but it is lower for the indexation policy (9:00% instead of 9:63% under
the benchmark).
This combination of parameters gives rise to a present value of consumption11 that is marginally
higher under the contribution policy for all the cohorts aged 45 or more, and ultimately produces
a tiny welfare improvement under such policy. In fact, 51:29% of the population now opt for the
contribution policy, and the social welfare improvement with this policy is between 0:11% and
0:24% of certain equivalent consumption of an average individual during her remaining lifetime
(see Table 4).
Table 4. Variations on the baseline I
Prob. Ft < 105% CA
1 (%) Welfare comparison (%)
Index. Contr. Index. ￿CA
1 ￿CT
1 D1
Benchmark 20.7147 21.8187 88.0140 -0.5613 -0.4823 39.6923
re = 4% 22.2107 23.3827 82.9388 -0.9171 -0.3320 39.9639
re = 7% 19.3680 20.1693 92.5923 -0.4671 -0.2197 41.8710
Dutch correlations 23.3920 24.0680 85.1668 0.1093 0.2357 51.2939
The welfare comparison by cohorts (Figure 8) indicates a pattern similar to that under the
benchmark, although now fewer cohorts prefer the indexation policy. The preference for the con-
tribution policy is relatively larger among the low-skilled groups. In particular, 58:56% of the
individuals in the third group would be in favour of such policy.
11Computed discounting future consumption ￿ows at a ￿xed discount rate, equal to the average bond interest
rate.
26Figure 8. Contribution vs. indexation policy - Dutch correlations
￿CEC > 0: better-o⁄ with the contribution policy
5.3 Institutional features
Dutch pension fund regulation has evolved substantially in recent years. First, while in the past
bene￿ts were usually based on the ￿nal wage, now in most cases they are based on the average
wage, as has been assumed so far. Second, while liabilities used to be discounted at a ￿xed interest
rate (usually of 4%), the introduction of new international accounting standards require liabilities
to be discounted at the market yield curve.12 Here we explore the consequences of these changes.
We also investigate the consequences of parametric changes in the system, in particular, variations
in the restoration periods, the retirement age and the size of the second pillar relative to that of
the ￿rst pillar.
5.3.1 A ￿xed discount rate for liabilities
The yield curve varies substantially from year to year. This has profound e⁄ects on the behaviour
of the funding ratio, because the yield curve is used to discount the complete stream of future
pension bene￿ts. The Dutch pension sector often complains about the implied instability in the
funding ratio, which forces them to implement undesirable and often unnecessary policy adjust-
ments. To assess whether these complaints are warranted we rerun our simulations assuming that
the yield curve used to discount pension liabilities is ￿xed at its average pro￿le frkg
D
k=1 estimated
in Appendix 7.2.4 and shown in Figure 9.
Table 5 shows that with a ￿xed discounting pro￿le, either policy is more e⁄ective in reducing the
number of times in which the funding ratio falls below 105%, from around 20% of the benchmark
case to around 6%. The coe¢ cient of variation of the funding ratio also reduces sizably, from
around 19% to around 12%. Under this scenario, adjustments in the instrument parameters are
12Actually, discounting is against the spot swap curve. However, a su¢ ciently liquid market for swaps has not
existed for long enough to estimate a model for the swap curve.
27less frequently changed than under the benchmark: in 21:08% of the cases (instead of 28:82%) under
the indexation policy and in just 8:24% of the cases (instead of 13:91%) under the contribution
policy. As a result, the volatility of lifetime consumption is smaller under the contribution policy.
For this reason the three welfare measures all suggest a moderate welfare improvement under the
contribution policy. The analysis of alternative methods of discounting liabilities will be a topic for
future research.
5.3.2 Bene￿ts based on ￿nal wage
We consider now the case in which the bene￿t of a cohort entering retirement at age R+1 is based
on the ￿nal rather than the average wage, a situation that prevailed in the Netherlands before

























which replaces equation (10). Here we set ￿S = 0:365 to generate the same average replacement
rate as in the benchmark analysis. Notice that under this alternative bene￿ts are more heavily
exposed to shocks in income growth than under the benchmark. As a result, social welfare is much
lower than in the benchmark case (under indexation policy, CA
1 = 78:41% instead of 88:01% in
the benchmark case). Adjustments in indexation no longer a⁄ect workers and, hence, risk-sharing
between young and old via this channel is no longer possible.
We see from Table 5 that while a lower fraction of individuals now support a contribution
policy (32:81%), the di⁄erence in welfare between the two policies, as measured by the di⁄erence
in certainty equivalent consumption, is smaller.
5.3.3 Varying the restoration period in the short-term plan
We consider two alternative values for KS, namely a three-year and a ten-year restoration period.
The results are reported in Table 5. There are modest changes with respect to the benchmark
case. A (not surprising) e⁄ect is that an increase in the restoration period raises the percentage of
time the funding ratio falls below the 105% threshold (no more than 21% of the time when KS = 3
versus no more than 24% of the time when KS = 10). Under both alternatives, there is again
a large majority in favour of the indexation policy. An increase in the restoration period slightly
raises the relative desirability of the contribution policy as measured by the majority in favour of
it, which rises from 39% when KS = 3 to 44% when KS = 10, and also as measured in terms
of the di⁄erence in certainty-equivalent consumption of the alive generations, which rises from
￿0:47% when KS = 3 to ￿0:39% when KS = 10. Under a contribution policy a larger share of the
restoration burden can be shifted on future entrants into the labour market when the restoration
period is prolonged. This ameliorates the relative disadvantage to the contribution policy.
5.3.4 Varying the retirement age
Increasing life expectancy has prompted a number of countries to raise, sometimes gradually, the
retirement age while keeping the replacement rate unchanged. The retirement age a⁄ects not
only the individual life-cycle consumption pro￿le, but also the components of the funding ratio
(equations (11) and (12)). An increase in the retirement age implies an increase in the number of
people contributing to the pension fund and a reduction in the number of people receiving bene￿ts.
We consider two alternative values for the retirement age, namely retirement two years earlier than
28the benchmark (R = 38) and two years later than the benchmark (R = 42). In the new scenarios,
the model endogenously sets di⁄erent contribution rates: for the ￿rst pillar the initial values are
￿
F
1 = 19:59% and 13:62% if R = 38 and R = 42, respectively. For the second pillar, the initial
value are ￿
S
1 = 21:10% and 14:56%, respectively. In the benchmark case of Section 4.3 the initial
contribution rates are instead set to ￿
F
1 = 16:42% and ￿
S
1 = 17:58%. To preserve the average
second-pillar replacement rate of the benchmark analysis (37:60% of the ￿nal wage), we also set
the accrual rate to ￿ = 1:85% if R = 38 and ￿ = 1:664% if R = 42. The likelihood of underfunding
falls as the retirement age is increased. However, in terms of the welfare ranking we ￿nd no relevant
change (Table 5). A large majority of the individuals remain in favour of the indexation policy. A
reduction in the retirement age slightly reduces the relative preference for the indexation policy,
because the scope for escaping (through retirement) part of the burden of keeping the bu⁄er stable
is increased under the contribution policy.
5.3.5 Relative size of the two pillars
In our benchmark calibration, the expected replacement rates of ￿nal income from the ￿rst and
second pillars are respectively 30:40% and 37:60%. This roughly corresponds to the current sit-
uation in the Netherlands. However, it seems reasonable to believe that the second pillar will
become relatively more important in the future as the number of people participating in a pension
fund rises and the political support for a PAYG pension pillar in which current workers pay for
current retirees shrinks. Likely the ￿rst pillar will more and more become a provision to merely
keep retirees out of poverty.
We consider the case of ￿F = 11:19% and ￿ = 2:234%, while keeping the remaining parameters
at their benchmark values. This new calibration generates for the average-income individual an
expected replacement rate of the ￿nal wage of 20% and 48%, respectively, for the ￿rst and second
pension pillars. Hence the total replacement rate provided by the social security system is un-
changed on average (68%), but the second pillar has become larger relative to the ￿rst pillar. The
certainty-equivalent consumption di⁄erences, ￿CA
1 and ￿CT
1 , are closer to zero, and the fraction
of those in favour of the contribution policy has become slightly larger. All the indicators, however,
continue showing a preference for the indexation policy. Importantly, social welfare is larger under
this scenario than in the benchmark case (CA
1 = 90:47% instead of 88:01%) or any of the other
cases with changes in the institutional structure. A funded social security system is indeed welfare
improving in this economy. In the extreme situation with only the PAYG system (paying the same
average replacement rate as in the benchmark), social welfare would drop to CA
1 = 68:13%.
Table 5. Variations on the baseline II
Prob. Ft < 105% CA
1 (%) Welfare comparison (%)
Index. Contr. Index. ￿CA
1 ￿CT
1 D1
Benchmark 20.7147 21.8187 88.0140 -0.5613 -0.4823 39.6923
Fixed discounting 6.3427 7.5400 86.5875 0.6777 0.4429 65.9459
Final wage bene￿ts 22.7173 22.9333 78.4100 -0.4836 -0.0004 32.8114
Rest. period: KS = 3 21.0120 21.0920 87.9063 -0.4697 -0.5405 39.3408
Rest. period: KS = 10 22.7493 23.7453 88.0402 -0.3865 -0.5299 43.6697
Retirement age: age 63 21.6693 23.0613 89.0188 -0.3308 -0.2949 42.8349
Retirement age: age 67 19.7507 20.4613 87.0795 -0.5279 -0.3757 39.7242
Size of the two pillars 22.3907 23.6560 90.4717 -0.4660 -0.1093 40.8316
296 Conclusions and directions for future research
In this paper we have explored the inter-generational and intra-generational welfare implications
of di⁄erent pension bu⁄er policies in the context of an OLG model of a small-open economy. The
economy was subjected to demographic, ￿nancial and economic shocks estimated for the US, while
our two-pillar pension system was modelled after the Dutch system. Under a contribution policy,
the contribution rate was always adjusted ￿rst, followed by the indexation rates and a cut in
nominal pension rights (in the case of underfunding), while under an indexation policy indexation
to productivity and prices were always reduced ￿rst, followed by an increase in the contribution
rate and a reduction in nominal rights. In almost all variants we considered, the indexation policy
was preferred by a (large) majority, the reason being that pension risks (the risks associated with
maintaining a stable pension bu⁄er) can be spread over all generations when indexation rates are
adjusted, while the burden of changes in the contribution rate are borne entirely by the workers.
We have also quanti￿ed the welfare di⁄erences between the two policies for di⁄erent cohorts and
skill groups, showing that these di⁄erences are non-negligible when expressed in di⁄erences in
certainty equivalent consumption over the remaining lifetime. An important further result of our
simulations is that the funding ratios are highly volatile, while most of this volatility is caused by
the movements in the yield curve.
Future research will extend the work in this paper into several directions. In particular we
plan to focus on three aspects. First, we will explore the welfare implications of age-dependent
indexation. Since younger generations have accumulated fewer nominal assets, a reduction in
indexation a⁄ects the purchasing power of their accumulated claims to a smaller extent than that
of the old, while moreover the young have more time left for the expected restoration of their
purchasing power. This suggests that it may be bene￿cial to di⁄erentiate changes in indexation
by age. Second, we intend to introduce endogenous labour supply into the model, in order to take
account of the potential losses arising through the labour market distortions caused by changes
in pension contribution rates. Third, we want to include the current framework into a general
equilibrium setting, in which wages, interest rates and equity returns are endogenously determined.
A further extension concerns the inclusion of a demand side of the economy, which may help us
to asses whether it might be optimal to have pro-cyclical pension contribution rates that dampen
￿ uctuations in disposable income.
7 Appendix
7.1 Detailed rules for adjustment of policy parameters
The adjustment policy works as follows. In case no restoration plan from an earlier period is still
active in t:
1. If Ft < 1 + ￿
l, a short-term restoration plan is started that after Ks years in the absence
of shocks brings back along a linear growth path the funding ratio at 1 + ￿
l. Hence, the













set at period t such that the funding ratios e Ft+1; e Ft+2;:::; e Ft+Ks projected from Ft in the
absence of further shocks hit the target funding ratios
_
















is set according to either an indexation policy or a contribution
policy (see below). If after applying all these measures the funding ratio still falls short
30of
_
Ft+￿, we set ￿
S
t+￿ = ￿
S;max, ￿t+￿ = ￿t+￿ = 0 and apply a reduction in nominal rights
mt+￿ > 0 such that e Ft+￿ =
_
Ft+￿.
2. If 1 + ￿
l ￿ Ft < 1 + ￿
m, a long-term restoration plan is started that after Kl years in the
absence of shocks brings back along a linear growth path the funding ratio at 1+￿
m. Hence,












is set at period t such that the funding ratios e Ft+1; e Ft+2;:::; e Ft+Kl projected from Ft in the
absence of further shocks hit the target funding ratios
_
Ft+￿ = Ft + [(1 + ￿
m) ￿ Ft] ￿
Kl for







is set according to either an indexation policy or a contribution
policy (see below). If after applying all these measures the funding ratio still falls short of
_
Ft+￿, we set ￿
S
t+￿ = ￿
S;max, ￿t+￿ = ￿t+￿ = 0, but we apply no reduction in nominal rights.
3. If 1 + ￿
m ￿ Ft < 1 + ￿
u, there are two cases.
(a) In the absence of any missed nomimal rights (see below), the next-year policy parameters




t and ￿t+1 = ￿t+1 = 1.
(b) In the presence of missed (unrestored) nominal rights, the next-year policy parameters




t and ￿t+1 = ￿t+1 = 0.
4. If Ft ￿ 1 + ￿
u, mt+1 is set to restore any missed nominal rights (as described below) to the
extent that the funding ratio does not fall below the target ratio 1 + ￿
u.13 If after restoring
possible missed nominal rights still e Ft+1 > 1 + ￿
u, then further adjustment to the policy
parameters is made according to either an indexation policy or a contribution policy (as
described below). If after applying these measures still e Ft+1 > 1 + ￿
u, then price indexation
is raised by an extra amount ^ ￿t+1 > 0 such that over a period of three years along a linear
path in the absence of shocks the funding ratio is back at 1 + ￿
u.
In case a long-term restoration plan from an earlier period is still active in t:
1. If Ft < 1 + ￿
l, the long-term restoration plan is cancelled and the policymaker follows the
above policy under "no restoration plan" from an earlier period still active in t. That is, it
sets up a short-run restoration plan as determined above.
2. If 1 + ￿
l ￿ Ft < 1 + ￿
m, there are two cases:
(a) If Ft < Ft, either an indexation policy or a contribution policy is used to produce
a modi￿ed long-term restoration plan in exactly the same way as described above,
but only over the remaining years of the original plan. If this implies that the next




S;max, ￿t+1 = ￿t+1 = 0 and no further action is undertaken.
(b) If Ft ￿ Ft < 1 + ￿
m, the policy parameters are those prescribed by the long-term
restoration plan.
3. If 1 + ￿
m ￿ Ft < 1 + ￿
u, then the above policy under "no restoration plan" from an earlier
period still active in t is followed.
13Dutch pension law says that a pension fund is not allowed to reduce contribution rates until any earlier reduction
in nominal rights is undone.
314. If Ft ￿ 1+￿
u, then the above policy under "no restoration plan" from an earlier period still
active in t is followed.
In case a short-term restoration plan from an earlier period is still active in t:
1. If Ft < 1 + ￿
l, there are two cases:
(a) If Ft < Ft, either an indexation policy or a contribution policy is used to produce a
modi￿ed short-term restoration plan exactly in the same way as above, but only over
the remaining years of the original plan. If after applying these measures next period￿ s
funding ratio still falls below Ft+1, the policymaker sets ￿
S
t+1 = ￿
S;max, ￿t+1 = ￿t+1 = 0
and mt+1 > 0 such that in the absence of shocks e Ft+1 = Ft+1.
(b) If Ft ￿ Ft < 1+￿
l, the policy parameters are those prescribed by the existing short-term
restoration plan.
2. If 1 + ￿
l ￿ Ft < 1 + ￿
m, then the above policy under no restoration plan from an earlier
period still active in t is followed. That is, a long-term restoration plan is set up in the way
described above.
3. If 1 + ￿
m ￿ Ft < 1 + ￿
u, then the above policy under no restoration plan from an earlier
period still active in t is followed.
4. If Ft ￿ 1 + ￿
u, then the above policy under no restoration plan from an earlier period still
active in t is followed.
The indexation and contribution policies are de￿ned as follows:
￿ Indexation policy:
1. If a short-term restoration plan is started in period t, productivity indexation ￿t+1 is
reduced up to a minimum level of zero to hit the prescribed target path. If this is
not enough, price indexation ￿t+1 is reduced up to a minimum level of zero. If this is
still not enough, the contribution rate ￿
S
t+1 is increased up to a maximum of ￿
S;max.
Analogously, when an existing short-term plan has to be modi￿ed.
2. If a long-term restoration plan is started in period t, productivity indexation ￿t+1 is
reduced up to a minimum level of zero to hit the prescribed target path. If this is
not enough, price indexation ￿t+1 is reduced up to a minimum level of zero. If this is
still not enough, the contribution rate ￿
S
t+1 is increased up to a maximum of ￿
S;max.
Analogously, when an existing long-term plan has to be modi￿ed.
3. If Ft ￿ 1+￿
u, after restoring the missed nominal rights (as described below), missed price
indexation is restored (as described below) to attain 1+￿
u. If this is not enough, missed
productivity indexation is restored (as described below). If this is still not enough, the
contribution rate ￿
S
t+1 is lowered up to a minimum of 0.
and
32￿ Contribution policy:
1. If a short-term restoration plan is started in period t, the contribution rate ￿
S
t+1 is
raised up to a maximum of ￿
S;max to hit the prescribed target path. If this is not
enough, productivity indexation ￿t+1 is reduced up to a minimum level of zero. If this
is still not enough, price indexation ￿t+1 is reduced up to a minimum level of zero.
Analogously, when an existing short-term plan has to be modi￿ed.
2. If a long-term restoration plan is started in period t, the contribution rate ￿
S
t+1 is raised
up to a maximum of ￿
S;max to hit the prescribed target path. If this is not enough,
productivity indexation ￿t+1 is reduced up to a minimum level of zero. If this is still not
enough, price indexation ￿t+1 is reduced up to a minimum level of zero. Analogously,
when an existing long-term plan has to be modi￿ed.
3. If Ft ￿ 1 + ￿
u, after restoring the missed nominal rights (as described below), the
contribution rate ￿
S
t+1 is reduced up to a minimum of 0 to attain 1 + ￿
u. If this is
not enough, missed price indexation is restored (as described below). If this is still not
enough, missed productivity indexation is restored (as described below).
We restore missed price and productivity indexation and missed nominal rights as follows. Let
us take the case of price indexation. For this case, we de￿ne two processes, an "actual" process
(tracking the actual indexation that has been given, where ￿ is long-run average in￿ ation),
p
￿;a
t = (1 + ￿t￿)p
￿;a
t￿1; (27)
and a "shadow" process that corresponds to always having full indexation:
p
￿;s
t = (1 + ￿)p
￿;s
t￿1: (28)





Suppose that in period t, the funding ratio exceeds 1+￿
u. Then, indexation for the next period




t , the indexation in the next
period will be set at most so high that the missed indexation is restored in expected terms. That is,




t+1, which is equivalent to (1 + ￿t+1￿)p
￿;a
t = (1 + ￿)p
￿;s
t ,






















Finally, we de￿ne ￿u
t+1 as the indexation rate that brings the funding ratio to 1 + ￿
u next year in












The processes continue further according to (27) and (28) until the end of the simulation run.
































1 = 1. Restoration of indexation is completely similar to that in the case of price
indexation.




















t and the funding
ratio exceeds 1 + ￿

























where e Ft+1 is the projection at time t + 1 of the funding ratio in the absence of further shocks.
To see the ￿rst argument of this expression, notice that if mt+1 = 1 ￿
e Ft+1
1+￿u, all nominal rights
are multiplied by the factor
e Ft+1
1+￿u. Hence, all future pension bene￿ts are multiplied by this same
factor and, then, total liabilities are multiplied by this same factor, implying that the funding ratio
becomes 1 + ￿
u.
7.2 Details on the calibration
7.2.1 Growth rate of the newborn cohort
For the number of births in the US between 1985 and 2005 (source: HMD, 2009), we estimate the
model:












This yields n = 0:0047362, ’ = 0:4543931 (standard error 0:2223041) and ￿n = 0:0132662 (stan-
dard error 0:0017105).
7.2.2 Survival probabilities
Our simulations require cohort life tables, which are incomplete for recent cohorts. Using easily
available period life tables, however, leads to an over-estimate of mortality because of the well
documented downward trend in mortality. To correctly estimate mortality, we follow the Lee-
Carter model (Lee and Carter, 1992) and collect from the HMD (2009) US period life tables from
1950 to 2005. These contain the total population on a year-by-year basis from ages 0 to 110. We
call  
p
j;t the probability of being alive in year t for individuals aged j, conditional on having been
alive at age j ￿ 1. To distinguish the trend from ￿ uctuations, we estimate with singular value
decomposition the parameters of the Lee-Carter model:
ln
￿




= ￿j + ￿j￿t + ￿
 
t ;
where ￿j and ￿j are age-varying parameters, ￿t is a time-varying vector and ￿
 
t is a random






. Lee and Carter (1992) point out that the parameterization














where t = 1;::;T indicates the sample period. With these restrictions the estimated value for ￿j
will be the average probability over the sample that someone dies at age j , when having survived
up to age j ￿ 1.14 Consistently with the existing literature we assume that the mortality index ￿t
evolves as a random walk with drift ￿:










. With our data we estimate ^ ￿ = ￿1:2595 and ^ ￿  = 0:0266, thereby implying a
trend fall in the probability of dying at any age j, conditional on having survived up to age j ￿ 1.
In the simulations we assume that ^ ￿ = 0 after year t = 40, that is, there is no further population
ageing after 40 years. We make this assumption to avoid dealing with very large contribution
rates in the ￿rst- and second-pillar systems and on the assumption that the ageing process cannot
continue forever.
From the period life table estimates and the trend of the mortality index we calculate the cohort
life tables as follows:
ln
￿
1 ￿  j;t￿j+1
￿
= ^ ￿j + ^ ￿j
￿
^ ￿t￿j+1 + j^ ￿
￿
= ^ ￿j + ^ ￿j^ ￿t+1
where t￿j+1 is the year of birth of the cohort. Thus  j;t￿j+1 indicates the (estimated) probability
of being alive at age j (end of period t) for the cohort of individuals born at the beginning of year




j=1 of the cohort born in year t = 0 are set equal to those of the actual cohort of individuals
born in 1950.
The survival probability for the cohort born in the following year t￿j +2 evolves according to:
ln
￿
1 ￿  j;t￿j+2
￿
= ^ ￿j + ^ ￿j
￿
^ ￿t￿j+2 + j^ ￿
￿
= ￿j + ^ ￿j
￿
^ ￿t￿j+1 + j^ ￿ + ^ ￿
￿
= ￿j + ^ ￿j
￿




1 ￿  j;t￿j+1
￿
+ ^ ￿j^ ￿
7.2.3 Economic shocks
We assume that the shocks to our ￿ve economic and ￿nancial variables (the in￿ ation rate, the
nominal wage growth rate, the one-year bond return, the equity return and the housing return)
evolve according to a VAR(1) process. The underlying data are the following time series: for the


























































= ^ ￿j, where ^ ￿j is the estimate of ￿j and ^ ￿
 
t is the regression residual. The last equality is
obtained by using that the sum of the residuals is zero.
35wage (source for both series: OECD, 2009); for the one-year bond return, the US end-of-year public
debt yield at maturity one year (source: Federal Reserve, 2009); for the equity return, the MSCI
US equity index (source: Datastream, 2009); for the housing return, the OFHEO house price index
(now FHFA index, source: Federal Housing Finance Agency, FHFA, 2009). All the series are
annual over the period 1976-2005 (30 observations). For each series we take the deviations from
the historical average.
Our shocks consist of a deterministic component, which is a linear combination of previous-
year shocks, and a purely random component, given by realizations from i.i.d. innovations. The
estimation of the deterministic component is shown in panel a of Table 6. It is worth pointing out
that no variable in the speci￿cation of the equity return is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero; indeed,
a Wald chi-squared test does not reject the hypothesis that equity returns follow a purely random
(white noise) process.
Table 6. VAR(1) regression
a. Deterministic coe¢ cient estimates (matrix B in (17))
Variable In￿ ation Wage Bond Equity Housing
In￿ ation (-1) 0.7864*** 0.3060** 0.3694** -1.5158 -0.8204***
(0.1747) (0.1192) (0.1840) (2.1683) (0.2660)
Wage (-1) 0.0185 0.6609*** -0.0786 0.3825 1.0658***
(0.1930) (0.1317) (0.2033) (2.3953) (0.2938)
Bond (-1) -0.0555 -0.1661** 0.6857*** 1.3535 -0.2609
(0.1104) (0.0753) (0.1163) (1.3700) (0.1681)
Equity (-1) 0.0094 0.0125 0.0252 -0.0247 0.0119
(0.0148) (0.0101) (0.01554) (0.1831) (0.0225)
Housing (-1) 0.2903*** 0.0957* 0.1533** -1.0446 0.6839***
(0.0779) (0.0531) (0.0821) (0.9669) (0.1186)
Wald chi-squared 149.1552 233.2539 171.2329 3.9514 93.5409
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5564 0.0000
Note: standard deviations in parentheses.
***: signi￿cant at 1%; **: signi￿cant at 5%; *: signi￿cant at 10%
b. Residual covariances and correlations (%)
Variable In￿ ation Wage Bond Equity Housing
In￿ ation 0.0136 50.2306 54.9103 20.8439 -15.2365
Wage 0.0047 0.0063 48.3280 -25.8828 -0.6701
Bond 0.0079 0.0047 0.0151 7.0268 4.7483
Equity 0.0353 -0.0299 0.0125 2.1005 0.2007
Housing -0.0032 -0.0001 0.0010 0.0005 0.0316
Note: correlations in italic; (co-)variances are in non-italic.
One-period innovations follow a multivariate normal distribution centered at 0 and with a
covariance matrix given by the covariances among the residuals in the VAR(1) regression (panel
b. of Table 6). We obtain a substantially higher variance for the equity return than for the other
variables. However, the standard deviation of the equity return (14:49%) is consistent with the
historical values reported in the literature (for instance, see Cocco et al., 2005) and remains of
36the same order of magnitude if we consider alternative sample periods. In contrast, if we consider
alternative sample periods and use our time series to compute average historical returns, we get
very di⁄erent values for di⁄erent sample periods. For this reason we prefer to independently set
average returns following the literature.
7.2.4 The yield curve
We assume that the interest rates (in excess of the rate at maturity 1) that form the yield curve
follow a vector autoregressive distributed lag (VADL) process of lag 1. Our dataset is an annual
time series from 1976 to 2005 of US public debt yields at maturities 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 20 and 30. (These
are the only observed maturities. Source: Federal Reserve). In our sample there are occasionally
missing values for yields at maturities 20 and 30. These we impute using linear interpolation.
The VADL(1) speci￿cation includes, as exogenous variables, the previous-year values of the ￿ve
economic and ￿nancial variables (in￿ ation rate, wage growth, equity, housing and bond returns).
The regression output is available upon request. In general, the excess interest rates are in￿ u-
enced more heavily by the previous-year realization of the excess interest rates at maturity 2 and
7, and the returns on the bond, equity and housing markets. Shocks across the di⁄erent maturi-
ties are highly positively correlated (between 71:67 and 99:51%), while their standard deviation is
higher at longer maturities (0:6652% at k = 30, compared to 0:1580% at k = 2).
The model is thus estimated at annual frequency and we use the regression output to generate
random interest rates at maturities k = 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 20 and 30. We then adopt a linear inter-
polation over these yields to obtain the interest rates at any discrete maturity between 2 and 30.
Interest rates at maturity longer than 30 are set equal to the interest rate at maturity k = 30.
The average yield curve frkg
D
k=1, shown in Figure 9, exhibits a quadratically-looking pattern as a
function of the maturity k. It increases monotonically up to k = 30, with an estimated interest
rate of 5:38%.
Figure 9. Average yield curve
377.2.5 Economic shocks based on Dutch data
In Section 5.2 we repeat our simulation exercise using simulations of shocks based on Dutch data.
We estimate a VAR equivalent to that in Appendix 7.2.3 for the US data. We use the following
time series: in￿ ation, nominal wage growth, the consumer price index and hourly wages from the
OECD; for the bond and equity returns, respectively, we use the interbank 3-month yield and the
MSCI Netherlands time series from Datastream. For the returns on housing, we use the NVM
series on transaction sales prices (source: NVM, 2009). All our series cover the period 1986-2005.
Estimation is at annual frequency. Table 7 reports the output of the VAR regression with one lag.
Table 7. VAR(1) regression - Dutch data
a. Deterministic coe¢ cient estimates (matrix B in (17))
Variable In￿ ation Wage Bond Equity Housing
In￿ ation (-1) 0.5677*** 0.1394 -0.2363 0.2888 -0.8646
(0.2003) (0.2104) (0.3480) (6.2916) (0.9773)
Wage (-1) 0.0067 0.4975* -0.2750 -2.9032 2.1597*
(0.2466) (0.2591) (0.4286) (7.7481) (1.2036)
Bond (-1) 0.1255* 0.1463** 0.8851*** -0.6454 -0.3535
(0.0670) (0.0704) (0.1165) (2.1063) (0.3272)
Equity (-1) -0.0029 0.0021 0.0135 0.2300 0.0919**
(0.0082) (0.0086) (0.0142) (0.2567) (0.0399)
Housing (-1) 0.0787* 0.0520 -0.0230 -1.1247 0.2564
(0.0420) (0.0441) (0.0730) (1.3193) (0.2049)
Wald chi-squared 34.8741 31.3047 73.6373 2.5262 18.2280
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7725 0.0000
Note: standard deviations in parentheses.
***: signi￿cant at 1%; **: signi￿cant at 5%; *: signi￿cant at 10%
b. Residual covariances and correlations (%)
Variable In￿ ation Wage Bond Equity Housing
In￿ ation 0.0038 45.4168 25.3558 0.6422 1.2253
Wage 0.0018 0.0042 37.3703 -9.9179 17.8927
Bond 0.0017 0.0026 0.0116 -8.1317 4.1643
Equity 0.0008 -0.0126 -0.0171 3.7951 53.8228
Housing 0.0002 0.0035 0.0014 0.3173 0.0916
Note: correlations in italic; (co-)variances are in non-italic.
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